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issues and means of evaluation are different. While practitioners and consumers should necessarily be encouraged
to learn the lessons and benefits of deception, perhaps this section should be
coupled with the one devoted to opensource analysis to discuss the still
unwieldy problems of the future of
intelligence—reams of information
from a variety of unknown sources that
current “INT” equipment and methods
are not ready to handle.
Overall, this book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community. As it is used in
classes, the outcomes of the debates it
will inevitably create should themselves become anthologies for future
readers.
JAMIESON JO MEDBY

RAND Corporation

William J. Lahneman, ed. Military Intervention:
Cases in Context for the 21st Century, Oxford,
U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 224 pp. $26.95

Most students of international affairs
would agree that understanding the
causes and results of military interventions is one of the more pressing security
issues facing the United States in the
early years of the twenty-first century.
William Lahneman, program coordinator of the Center for International and
Security Studies at the University of
Maryland, has assembled a gifted group
of analysts to examine seven instances of
military intervention and, through the
use of a common set of pertinent questions, attempt to reach a deeper understanding of interventions, while
identifying ways to increase the chances
of success in an intervention.
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The eleven contributors to this volume
have impressive credentials. Together,
they compose a potent mix of security
scholars and practitioners. In addition to
Lahneman himself, of special note are
William Zartman and John Steinbruner.
Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and
Conflict Resolution, and the Director of
Conflict Management at the Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
John Steinbruner, Director of the Center
for International and Security Studies at
the School of Public Policy, University
of Maryland, is also the author of The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton
Univ. Press, 2002), a seminal work in the
study of decision making.
Military Intervention examines six cases
of military intervention: Somalia
(1992), Bosnia (1991–94), Haiti (1994),
Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2000),
and East Timor (1999). A seventh case
involving Cambodia is also provided,
although in this instance, rather than
focusing on a single intervention, the
authors examine interventions from
1806 to 2003. Lahneman’s stated intention was that each case be examined
through the lens of nine discrete questions, ranging from the nature of the
intervention force to the extent to
which nonmilitary aspects of the intervention were necessary and sufficient to
produce a lasting peace. As analytical
approaches go, this one seems well
suited to support comparative analyses
and cross-case lessons. Unfortunately,
as is sometimes the case with a collection
of essays, some authors approached this
requirement with more rigor than others. The essay on Rwanda, written by
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, follows the formula most closely; the chapter on
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Cambodia veers the farthest from it.
Editing a volume of this nature can be a
thankless task, but Lahneman would
have been better served by insistence
that his contributors specifically answer
his questions. The lack of such consistency may obscure elements the cases
have in common, resulting in a missed
opportunity to increase a systemic understanding of intervention.
That said, this volume is a useful addition to the body of work that, to paraphrase Alexander George, attempts to
bridge the gap between the realms of
academic theory and practical application. Of particular value in this regard is
the first chapter of the book, written by
Steinbruner and Jason Forrester. The
authors confirm what many security professionals have long believed, that “civil
conflicts are actually economic battles
over the control of resources waged under
conditions in which allocation can not be
managed by legal methods or legitimate
government domination.”
Other chapters are less useful. First,
with the possible exception of East
Timor, there are deeper and more complete descriptions of the crises to be
found than those in this book. Second,
in some cases, the author’s conclusions
raise questions that beg to be answered
but are left hanging. For example, David
Laitin, writing on the intervention in
Somalia, argues that “early, decisive
action” could have been taken. Yet he
acknowledges the political will for such
early action was lacking and does not
address how such resolve might have
been created. Laitin also fails to ask how
an early intervention operation in Somalia could have been terminated.
Could the applicable mandate have
been achieved, or would long-term stability have required the presence of
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peacekeepers? Furthermore, Laitin perpetuates the idea that only eighteen
U.S. servicemen were killed in the battle
of Mogadishu. This number does not
take into account the deaths of two soldiers assigned to the reaction force, nor
does it acknowledge the Malaysian soldier who lost his life during the rescue
effort. This may seem a small point, but
it raises troubling questions about the
depth of Laitin’s research.
Steven Burg’s analysis of the intervention
in Bosnia reveals different shortcomings.
The key point of the chapter—that states
do not mount serious interventions unless national interests are involved—is
widely accepted. However, Burg’s chapter
contains both unsupported assertions and
a lack of detail concerning aspects of the
case that may not be familiar to the lay
reader. Still, his identification and description of seven stages of intervention is
both thought provoking and useful.
As mentioned earlier, the case on
Rwanda is well written and argued.
Khadiagala does not insult the reader’s
intelligence by asserting that Western
states could not have intervened in
time—he clearly attributes their failure
to act in Rwanda to a lack of political
will. More debatable is his assertion
that both sides in the conflict were
counting on external actors to save
them from a weak peace agreement.
The evidence presented seems sketchy,
especially given the Revolutionary
United Front’s reluctance to allow any
effort at a political settlement until it
had conquered the country.
The cases on Haiti, East Timor, and Sierra
Leone are straightforward. Their respective conclusions include the ideas that
fostering peace is conducive to longterm U.S. security, that valid political
processes are central to peace, that
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military intervention alone is not enough
to “end a conflict whose basic cause is
state collapse,” and that peacekeepers
may be better served by developing successful strategies to transfer power than
by focusing on “exit strategies.” These
conclusions are well supported, and it is
difficult to argue with any one of them.
The case of Cambodia, presented in
such a different fashion, concludes that
future military intervention in Cambodia is unlikely. The analysis predicts
that other interventions—notably exploitative economic ones—will increase
and that the forces of globalization will
prove injurious to the average Khmer.
Unfortunately, the chapter ends before
explaining these findings in detail.
The final chapter, written by Lahneman
himself, is in many ways the most valuable. Lahneman provides his own summary of the book’s cases, then identifies
a variety of challenges and prescriptions
associated with intervention operations.
These findings range from the commonsense (“A coalition of willing states
should conduct military intervention”)
to the provocative (“Operations taken
solely for humanitarian reasons tend to
be too little and too late”).
In the final analysis, Lahneman’s book
is less useful for the insights it provides
into the specifically examined cases
than for the questions it raises that
should be answered before any intervention is ordered. This work is also an
invitation to deepen the current national discussion on intervention and
nation building. As Lahneman suggests,
this discussion is too important to be
confined to the ivory tower; the invitation should not go unanswered by the
academic and security communities.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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Moore, Jeffrey M. Spies for Nimitz: Joint Military
Intelligence in the Pacific War. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2004, 336pp. $29.95

Despite its title, this book is not about
spies but about what is referred to in
today’s parlance as “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”: a sustained
process of research and analysis, based
on all source collection efforts, that
identifies important aspects of potential
combat environments. Intelligence
preparation of the battlefield provides
planners and commanders with “combat intelligence”—about the terrain,
weather conditions, enemy order of
battle and dispositions—needed to
conduct an upcoming operation. For
instance, without knowledge of tidal
conditions, currents, the composition
and slope of a beach, or the location of
underwater obstructions and mines,
amphibious operations can be doomed
to failure before they begin.
In this history of the performance of
U.S. intelligence in the Pacific during
World War II, Jeffrey Moore links the
intelligence provided to planners by the
Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean
Area (JICPOA) to the outcome of the
major amphibious assaults against
Japanese-occupied islands. Intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, always
important, was of great strategic significance in the “island hopping” campaign
undertaken by the United States. Planners had to identify atolls or islets that
were lightly defended by the Japanese
yet possessed the anchorages, landing
strips, and flat terrain that made them
suitable as operating bases for the next
stage in the campaign. When intelligence analysts provided accurate pictures of the battlefield, operations
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